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CASE NOTES
On the other hand, it must be owned that, had the case come up for de-
cision within the twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five years before the Act of 1952
went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the claims would
have been held invalid.28
In failing to cite the Cuno case, it is evident that Judge Hand finds "pat-
entable invention" sufficiently described by the case law and the statute,
and recognizes the legislative right: ". . . reinstate the courts' initial inter-
pretation, even though it may have been obscured by a series of later com-
ments whose upshot is at best hazy." 29
Thus, the implication arises that, at best, Judge Hand treats "flash of
genius" as an unwarranted deviation from established case law.
Finally, in the case of R. M. Palmer Co. v. Luden's Inc.,30 the court
held a design patent for a hollow chocolate figure valid, finding that the
designs were new, original and ornamental, and, tested objectively, the al-
leged invention met the standard of 35 U.S.C. 103. Further, the court
clearly pointed out that the Act repudiated the "flash of genius" require-
ment, thus confirming in statutory form what had been case law for many
years prior thereto.
2 s Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 224 F. 2d 530, 535 (C.A. 2d, 1955).
29 Ibid., at 537. 30 128 F. Supp. 672 (E.D. Pa., 1955).
SALES-HOLDER OF CERTIFICATE OF TITLE ESTOPPED
BY TRANSFER OF AUTOMOBILE IN ORDINARY
COURSE OF BUSINESS
Plaintiffs, who are wholesale automobile dealers in New Mexico and
Colorado, sold several automobiles at their places of business to a licensed
used car dealer from Utah. Possession of the automobiles was transferred
to the purchaser with knowledge that he was a used car dealer and that
he intended to take the automobiles to his place of business in Utah for
purpose of resale. The foreign certificates of title showing plaintiffs to be
the legal owners together with sight drafts were forwarded to a Utah
bank on an agreement that the buyer would pay the drafts before obtain-
ing the certificates. The buyer never paid the drafts and never received
the certificates. About a month later, the retailer sold the automobiles to
the defendants at his place of business in Utah in the usual course of trade
for a valuable consideration. Defendants made no inquiry of him as to the
title certificates or his authority to sell, and had no actual knowledge of
the original sales arrangement. Plaintiffs brought the replevin actions in
Utah for the automobiles. The Utah Supreme Court, refusing to apply a
Utah automobile statute, denied recovery on the ground of estoppel.
Heaston v. Martinez, 282 P. 2d 833 (Utah, 1955).
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One basic property law rule is that one who has no title can transfer
none. However, according to the doctrine of estoppel, if the owner is by
his conduct precluded from denying the seller's authority to sell, the
buyer may acquire a valid title although the seller had neither title nor
authority to transfer title.' In order to give rise to an estoppel it is essen-
tial that the party estopped shall have made a representation by words or
acts that the seller is the owner thereof or has authority to sell the same,
and that someone shall have acted on the faith of this representation in
such a way that he cannot without damage withdraw from the trans-
action. A transfer of possession, while in itself insufficient to create an
estoppel, may produce that result if possession is transfered to one who
habitually sells such goods with authority to exhibit the goods to possible
purchasers and obtain offers from them.2 The foregoing principle has been
the subject of codification.3
The sale of an automobile introduces a situation made complex by the
enactment of statutes regulating registration and the certificate of title.4
The most complete form of certificate of title law provides for central
recordation of encumbrances and changes of title to the auto with the
record appearing on a single instrument, the certificate of title. When
an auto is sold, the seller's certificate is given to the purchaser, who sends
it to the state agency. The state notes the change in ownership and issues
a new certificate to the purchaser, and a complete record of changes in
title results."
The statutory regulations, not being uniform among the states, pro-
duce diverse results when the transferor fails to transfer the, certificate
of title to the transferee. An arbitrary classification may be formulated:
12 Williston, Sales §§ 310-316 (rev. ed., 1948).
2 "Even in this case an innocent purchaser is not protected, but slight additional
circumstances may turn the scale." Ibid., § 315. Consult Zendman v. Harry Winston,
Inc., 305 N.Y. 180, 111 N.E. 2d 871 (1953) for a lucid analysis of estoppel in the
salesroom cases.
3 Uniform Sales Act § 23; Uniform Trust Receipts Act § 9-2(c); Uniform Com-
mercial Code § 2-403 (2): "Any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who
deals in goods of that kind gives him power to transfer all rights of the entruster to
a buyer in ordinary course of business."
4 Certificate of title acts are readily distinguishable from registration laws in that
the latter do not and are not intended to control tide. The purpose of registration
laws is to aid the state in the collection of taxes and in apprehending violators of
highway regulations. An owner's registration card, since it is for tax purposes, must
be renewed annually, whereas a certificate is good until the car is sold.
5 Those states which do not reguire certificates of title are Alabama, Connecticut,
Georgia, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Hampshire,
New York, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Vermont.
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1. The statute expressly renders the transaction void.6 Interpretations of these
statutes have been inconsistent, 7 some courts literally following the language of
the statute, s while others give it a liberal interpretation.
2. The statute provides that the owner has committed a misdemeanor but
it does not expressly render the transaction void. 10 The courts hold in such a
case that the transaction is not rendered invalid."
A further complication, the one with which the instant case is con-
cerned, arises when a court applies its certificate of title statute in an
estoppel situation. Whether a buyer who has not received a certificate
of title will be protected will depend upon the phraseology and the
judicial interpretation of the local statute.
Utah, a state in the first category, when confronted with that situation
in Swartz v. White,1 2 concluded that there was no estoppel because the
buyer was not a bona fide purchaser. The Court stated:
Without attempting to decide the complete meaning or full operation of this
provision of the statute, it is sufficient to say that the circumstances in this case,
in view of that statute, amount to a flag of warning to any intending pur-
chaser .... 13
The transaction which confronted the Utah court in the instant case
included one fact which distinguished it from the Swartz case-the auto-
mobiles in question were foreign automobiles. Plaintiff's argument was
based upon a Utah statute which provided that:
Until the department shall have issued such new certificate of registration and
certificate of ownership, delivery of any vehicle required to be registered shall
be deemed not to have been made and title thereto shall be deemed not to have
passed .... 14
6 Utah Code Ann. (1953) § 41, c. 1(72). But the Utah code in section 76 of the
same chapter also provides that the immediate effect is the commission of a mis-
demeanor by the owner.
7 See Jackson v. James, 97 Utah 41, 89 P. 2d 235 (1939) for a dissent which reviews
the cases in the field.
8 The buyer cannot rescind and recover the purchase price since the court will
not aid the parties on a transaction specifically made illegal and void by the legis-
lature. Reeb v. Danley, 221 S.W. 2d 579 (Tex. Civ. App., 1949).
9 Transfer of an automobile as a gift without the transfer of the certificate of title
does not invalidate the gift. Jackson v. James, 97 Utah 41, 89 P. 2d 235 (1939).
10 Uniform Motor Vehicle Anti-Theft Act § 6(b). Nine states have adopted the
Act, including Illinois and Utah. Consult the Handbook of the National Conference of
Uniform Laws 69 (1943), declaring the act obsolete and abrogating its recommenda-
tion for adoption by the states.
11 Pageanas v. Mixon Motor Co., 344 Ill. App. 446, 101 N.E. 2d 280 (1951); Smith
v. Rust, 310 Ill. App. 47, 33 N.E. 2d 723 (1941).
12 80 Utah 150, 13 P. 2d 643 (1932).
13 Ibid., at 158, and 646. 14Utah Code Ann. (1953) § 41, c. 1(72).
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and that, therefore, defendant-purchaser, under the Swartz case, was not
a bona fiide purchaser because of the failure to receive a certificate of title,
in violation of the statute, put him on notice and required him to make
inquiry. Defendant answered that the statute was not applicable to the set
of facts because of another Utah statute which stated that:
When the transferee of a vehicle is a dealer who holds the same for resale ... ,
the transferee shall not be required to obtain transfer of registration of such
vehicle or forward the certificate of title and registration to the depart-
ment .... 15
The court, following the reasoning of the defendant, ruled that there
was an estoppel because the statute cited by the plaintiff did not apply to
this particular set of facts.
The position of Illinois, a state in the second category, as to the auto-
mobile salesroom cases when the buyer of an automobile fails to receive
a certificate of title from a party not authorized to sell the same, is repre-
sented by a conflict of decision at the appellate level on the effect of
title certificates under the Uniform Motor Vehicle Anti-Theft Act. The
appellate court of the second district, in L. B. Motors, Inc. v. Prichard,'6
after ruling that there was an estoppel, held that the Illinois certificate of
title acts are anti-theft acts only and were not intended as recording
statutes, and do not in any way alter the effect of the provisions of the
Uniform Sales Act. 7 But Mori v. Chicago National Bank,'8 a case on
similar facts in the appellate court of the first district, held that the pur-
chaser's failure to get the certificate of title was an incident which, taken
together with other evidence, can establish neglect on the part of the pur-
chaser, and refused to invoke the doctrine of estoppel. The factual situa-
tion of the instant case, however, has not yet been adjudicated in Illinois. 9
15 Ibid., at S 65.
16 L. B. Motors, after entering into a conditional sales contract with Hunt, trans-
ferred possession of an automobile to him with knowledge that he was a retailer.
Hunt, after executing a conditional sales contract to Emma Weiss, assigned the note
and the contract to Prichard. Upon default of Weiss, Prichard took possession of
the car. A replevin suit instituted by L. B. Motors against Prichard was unsuccessful.
303 Ill. App. 318, 25 N.E. 2d 129 (1940). Cf. Pageanas v. Mixon Motor Co., 310 IMl.
App. 446. 101 N.E. 2d 280 (1951); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Horan, 325 III. App.
625, 60 N.E. 2d 763 (1945); Smith v. Rust, 310 Ill. App. 47, 33 N.E. 2d 723 (1941).
17 The introduction of the Uniform Motor Vehicle Anti-Theft Act stated that its
purpose was "to facilitate the recovery of stolen or unlawfully taken motor vehi-
cles. . . ." 11 U.L.A. 142 (1938).
is Mori entrusted his car to a dealer to procure bids and the dealer borrowed
money from the bank on the security of a trust receipt covering the car. After the
dealer absconded and the bank took possession of the car, Mori demanded the auto-
mobile, sued for conversion, and was awarded judgment. 3 Ill. App. 2d 49, 120 N.E.
2d 567 (1954); noted in 33 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 21 (1954); 30 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 592 (1955).
19 However, Utah Code Ann. (1953) 541, c. 1(65) and Ill. Rev. Stat. (1953) c.
95 5s 80(d) are alike since they were both adopted from the Uniform Motor Vehicle
Anti-Theft Act.
CASE NOTES
The problem which the certificate of title laws present to the courts
is one of statutory construction. Indicating that uniformity is not to be
expected, a Utah dissent summarized a key to the solution:
Only those authorities in states having substantially the same statute as we
have will be found helpful, and then only if the facts in each case are carefully
considered, for in very few fields of the law is the adage that "circumstances
alter cases" more applicable.20
2oJackson v. James, 97 Utah 41, 51, 89 P. 2d 235, 239 (1939).
TRUSTS-BROAD POWERS OF CONTROL, RIGHT OF
REVOCATION, AND RETENTION OF INCOME
BY SETTLOR HELD NOT TO INVALIDATE
INTER VIVOS TRUST
In a suit by the administrators of the. estate of a deceased settlor to de-
termine the validity of declarations of trust and ownership of the corpus
of the trust, it was seen that the settlor had purchased stock on four dif-
ferent occasions taking title in his own name as trustee for a beneficiary.
At each purchase he had executed an instrument designated "Declaration
of Trust-Revocable" in which he recited he held the stock in trust for the
beneficiary subject to the following provisions: that all cash dividends were
to be paid to him individually for his own personal account and used dur-
ing his lifetime; that he reserved the right as trustee to vote, sell, redeem,
exchange or otherwise deal in or with the stock, but upon any sale or re-
demption of the stock, the trust would terminate as to the stock sold or
redeemed and he would be entitled to the proceeds of the sale or redemp-
tion for his own personal account and use; that he reserved the right at
anytime to change the beneficiary or revoke the trust, but no such change
or revocation except by death of the beneficiary should be effective as to
the company until written notice thereof was delivered to the company.
In the event the trust was revoked or otherwise terminated, the stock and
all rights and privileges thereunder would belong to him. Held, that the
trust declarations executed by the deceased constituted a valid inter vivos
trust and were not invalid as attempted testamentary dispositions. Farkas
v. Williams, 5 111. 2d 417, 125 N.E. 2d 600 (1955).
The trust "is an institute of great elasticity and generality."' The in-
stant case touches the elasticity of the trust in one of its many aspects,
namely, the post-mortem distribution of property, or as it is commonly
called, the inter vivos trust. Actually, in effect it is a testamentary dispo-
sition of property which one usually thinks of as being accomplished by
a will.2 By definition, a will is, "the expression, in the manner required by
1 Maitland, Equity 23 (1936).
2 The trust does have 2 of the 3 important qualities of a will: it is revocable and it
